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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become commonplace to claim that legal scholarship has seen a boom 
in empirical approaches and even that empirical work 'has infiltrated the legal 
community'.1 Even if the size of this boom is contested and may itself invite 
empirical scrutiny, it seems safe to say that the claim found widespread 
support among the people who gathered at Umeå University in March 2017 
for the inaugural NoLesLaw workshop. One might even say that the 
participants were gathered to celebrate this successful infiltration of the legal 
community since hiding behind this particular academic acronym was the 
Network of Legal Empirical Scholars. 
The present issue sees the fruits of this infiltration with a number of 
interesting contributions demonstrating the lasting value of empirical work 
in law. However, before getting carried away with all the wonderful new toys 
and the sophisticated tools suddenly available in the legal scholars' toolbox, 
this introductory contribution tries to take a step back and ask a few pressing 
philosophical questions at the empirical turn.2 To do so, I first turn to 
another quote, this time with a somewhat more skeptical tone. The quote 
comes from Kenneth A. Armstrong who in 1998 asked the following 
question: 'Political science has discovered the European Court of Justice. But 
has it discovered law?'3  
Of course, political science is only one among many empirical approaches to 
the legal field and it may not necessarily be representative of such approaches 
in a present day context.4 However, I think Armstrong's question is 
interesting because it is one example of a generic question that I believe 
almost all legal empirical scholars have been asked at one point or another by 
some of their more traditional doctrinal colleagues. In its generic version, 
Armstrong's question runs as follows: 'Very well dear colleague, you may have 
                                                 
1 Lee Eppstein and Andrew D. Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research 
(Oxford University Press 2014) vii. 
2 In so doing, I shall be drawing extensively on work co-authored with Mikael Rask 
Madsen, in particular on the paper 'Toleration, Synthesis or Replacement? The 
'Empirical Turn' and its Consequences for the Science of International Law' (2016) 
29 Leiden Journal of International Law 1001-1019. 
3 Kenneth A. Armstrong, 'Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of 
European Integration' (1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 155, at 155. 
4 For instance, this issue contains a number of big data empirical approaches that were 
not applied in 1998 including, for example, computer-based corpus linguistics 
(Holtermann & Kjær) and citation network analysis (Frese and Olsen). 




discovered [insert your favorite empirical legal fact discovered with your 
favorite empirical method]. But have you discovered law?' 
To illustrate, I can provide an example from my own experience. In the 
present issue, Anne Lise Kjær and I contribute the article 'What 'If'? Silent 
Prologue and Paradigm in the Emerging Epistemic Community of 
International Criminal Justice',5 which is based on a computer-driven corpus 
linguistic study of all judgments from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) from 1996-2017. In this study, my co-author and I 
discovered that the frequency of the use of ifs in all judgements issued over 
this period exhibited a steady annual decline from 93 per 100,000 words on 
average in 1996 to 34 in 2017.  
As we argue in the article, my co-author and I take this particular discovery 
to be profoundly interesting, with the potential to deepen our understanding 
not only of international criminal law but of legal knowledge as such. 
Nevertheless, while working on the article we were countless times asked 
questions virtually identical to Armstrong's, i.e. along the lines of: 'Very well 
dear [Anne Lise and Jakob], you may have discovered [a statistically 
significant steady drop in the use of ifs in the ICTY/ICTR case law across a 
22-year period using computer driven corpus linguistics]. But have you 
discovered [international criminal] law?' 
From what I hear from other legal empirical researchers, my co-author and I 
are not alone in being confronted with this kind of question. Whether 
engaged in citation networks analysis, interviewing judges or the like, 
empirical researchers very often report being asked, 'Armstrong-style', what 
their empirical results have to do with law. When asked this way, the 
question is often a rhetorical one. Starting from the assumption of a 
categorical difference between the empirical facts found and the law, the 
questioner rarely seems to expect that the empirical discovery does in fact 
have any significance for the study of law or for legal knowledge. As such, the 
question does not always mark the starting point of a fruitful discussion. 
However, when asked in earnest, it is actually a very good question and one 
that all empirically minded legal scholars ought to ask themselves, not only to 
be able to fend off their more combative traditional doctrinal law colleagues. 
It is important to see that Armstrong's question can be posed and answered 
at different levels of abstraction. It can be answered concretely with 
                                                 
5 Cf. this issue at 49-90. 
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reference to any given study, i.e. with a view to demonstrating the legal 
relevance of that particular study. Thus, in our article, my co-author and I 
have naturally tried to demonstrate the specific legal significance of our 
corpus linguistic findings. I imagine other legal empirical scholars routinely 
do the same regarding their own work. However, considering the high 
frequency of these skeptical questions and the commonalities between them, 
even when posed in relation to quite diverse empirical studies, it would be a 
mistake to approach it as if we were dealing with a new question every time. 
For the sake of thought economy, we should also reflect upon Armstrong's 
question at a more general level. 
Conceived at this level, it remains a good question because it points to a larger 
set of equally good and challenging questions, including: 
(1) In what sense do these new empirical studies form part of a legal science? 
(2) Why, if at all, should they be pursued at a law faculty?  
(3) What do the countless new empirical studies tell us about valid law? 
(4) What do they tell us about what legal rules exist, what obligations and 
rights people have, etc.?  
(5) How do empirical findings relate to the kind of knowledge traditionally 
sought in the doctrinal study of law? 
These are all good philosophical questions, which ultimately address the 
epistemological foundations of legal science and the conditions of possibility 
of legal science. 
As such, these are also questions which ought to be at the heart of European 
empirical legal scholarship, perhaps more so than has hitherto been the case 
in the US, where empirical legal studies have had a much longer and more 
influential history than on this side of the Atlantic. As I have argued 
elsewhere, philosophical concerns about the epistemological foundations of 
legal science seem historically to have played a less prominent role in 
American legal scholarship than in its European counterpart.6 This 
difference is particularly evident if we directly compare the more pragmatic 
                                                 
6 Cf. Jakob v. H. Holtermann, 'Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s), 
Legal Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence' (2016) 29(4) Ratio 
Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 535 and Jakob 
v. H. Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, 'European New Legal Realism and 
International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible' (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 211. 




and reform-oriented American legal realism with its 'scientistic' 
Scandinavian cousin. However, the (continental) European concerns 
regarding the philosophical foundations of legal science are manifest also in 
the long debates between the doctrinal scholar Hans Kelsen and the more 
sociological scholars Max Weber, Eugen Ehrlich and Alf Ross.7 In line with 
this tradition, it seems that, unlike the Americans, present-day European 
empirical legal scholars cannot simply content themselves with pursuing 
empirical work. They have, in addition, to address the foundational 
philosophical questions directly. 
II. TOLERATION, REPLACEMENT, AND SYNTHESIS: A TAXONOMICAL 
APPROACH TO THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
At the same time, however, I should emphasize that the aim of this 
contribution is not to try to develop one unique reply to Armstrong's 
questions about how empirical findings really relate to law. While tempting, 
it simply does not seem fruitful or even feasible to try to outline, almost 
Vienna Circle style, one common philosophical program to which all 
European legal empirical scholars could sign up.8 This group is simply too 
diverse, and this is perhaps as it should be. 
                                                 
7 Kelsen was deeply troubled by the challenge of empirical approaches to law and 
vehemently resisted recurring attempts by empirically minded scholars to make 
inroads into legal scholarship. Thus, over a period of more than 50 years, Kelsen 
confronted a series of empiricists starting with legal sociologists Eugen Ehrlich and 
Max Weber (in General Theory of Law and State (Law Book Exchange 2009), especially 
'Part One, XII. Normative and Sociological Jurisprudence') and ending with 
Scandinavian legal realist Alf Ross (Hans Kelsen, 'Eine 'Realistische' und die Reine 
Rechtslehre. Bemerkungen zu Alf Ross: On Law and Justice' (1959–60) 10 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Offentliches Recht 1). For their part, Ehrlich, Weber 
and Ross all provided substantive reflections on the relationship between empirical 
and legal scholarship, each in their own distinct way and with quite different 
conclusions. Cf. e.g. Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 
(Transaction Publishers 2001), Max Weber, Critique of Stammler (Free Press 1977), 
and Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (Stevens & Sons Ltd 1958). 
8 Together with Mikael Rask Madsen, I have developed one reply to these questions. 
Drawing on inspirations from Weberian sociology of law, Alf Ross's Scandinavian 
legal realism and combining them with insights originating from Bourdieusian 
sociology, Madsen and I have outlined a research program for an empirical science of 
law that attempts to address the questions mentioned. To emphasize the European 
heritage and distinguish this approach from what we argue are less philosophically 
concerned American realist approaches, we have dubbed this approach European New 
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What does make sense, what in fact seems imperative, is to instead try to 
provide a framework within which to situate the necessary discussions about 
the pressing philosophical questions relating to the epistemological 
implications and status of the empirical findings that scholars of this sort 
might unearth.9 In co-authored work, Madsen and I have tried to sketch out 
a taxonomy consisting of three basic ideal types in terms of the 
epistemological understanding of the interface of law and empirical studies, 
namely toleration, synthesis and replacement. I shall briefly outline each of these 
positions providing examples of characteristic scholarship. My goal here is 
twofold: to understand the underlying epistemological premises of different 
positions in relation to empirical legal scholarship and to explain how such 
ideas enable (or rule out) different forms of empirical legal scholarship. 
1. Toleration 
The first approach is perhaps also the one most commonly adopted in 
traditional doctrinal legal scholarship. This position is termed toleration since 
proponents accept the presence and even the legitimacy of empirical studies 
of law, but they do so only somewhat reluctantly and while simultaneously 
emphasizing the subordinate character of such studies vis-á-vis the mother 
discipline, i.e. doctrinal law. Armstrong expressed this attitude of toleration 
in his rhetorical question. 
Toleration thus conceived is closely associated with the classic positivist 
theories of Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart but also includes present-day proponents 
of positivism like Jan Klabbers,10 Jörg Kammerhofer,11 Ino Augsberg,12 and 
Jean d'Aspremont13 – to mention just a few. Finally, the position is not 
                                                 
Legal Realism. Cf. notably Holtermann and Madsen (n 6); and Jakob v. H. Holtermann 
and Mikael Rask Madsen, 'What is Empirical in Empirical Studies of Law? A 
European New Legal Realist Conception' [2016] Retfærd. Nordic Journal of Law and 
Justice 3-21. 
9 The rest of this contribution relates closely to work co-authored with Madsen, cf. 
Holtermann and Madsen (n 2). 
10 Jan Klabbers, 'The Bridge Crack'd: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations' 
(2009) 23 International Relations 119. 
11 Jörg Kammerhofer, 'Hans Kelsen in Today's International Legal Scholarship' in Jörg 
Kammerhofer (ed), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2014) 81. 
12 Ino Augsberg, 'Von Einem neuerdings erhobenen empiristischen Ton in der 
Rechtswissenschaft' (2012) 51 Der Staat 117. 
13 Jean d'Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the 
Ascertainment of Legal Rules (2011). 




confined to positivism but can be found also in the work of, for example, 
Ronald Dworkin.14 Proponents of toleration base their reserved attitude to 
empirical work on two related but logically distinct arguments. First, they 
maintain that exclusively empirical approaches cannot capture the essential 
character of the legal field in its entirety. It bases this claim on the 
assumption of a categorical divide between Sein and Sollen, facts and norms, 
the descriptive and the normative, the external and the internal. Observing 
that law consists of legal rules which are normative phenomena, toleration 
infers that law as such necessarily remains categorically impervious to 
empirical studies. 
This idea is reflected in Kelsen's idea that empirical science can only study 
the Sein and never the Sollen of law. It also recurs in Hart's equally well-known 
distinction between internal and external aspects of legal rules.15 To both 
Hart and Kelsen, all identification of valid law in practice requires 
engagement in inter-normative reasoning beginning from a presupposed 
starting point and leading to the ascertainment of primary legal rules as parts 
of a given legal system. In other words, a pure, doctrinal study of law using the 
legal method.16 
The second main argument, which is applied by at least some proponents of 
toleration,17 is more radical. This argument holds that not only can empirical 
legal studies never exhaust the field, but they are also conceptually and 
epistemologically dependent upon doctrinal studies. Accordingly, the 
ambitions of some empirical scholars are fundamentally misguided because 
they fail to appreciate the asymmetric, inferior interrelation between their 
                                                 
14 Cf., for example, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Hart Publishing 1998). 
15 Hart applies this distinction to explain how a habit differs from a rule: 'A social rule 
has an 'internal' aspect, in addition to the external aspect which it shares with a social 
habit and which consists in the regular uniform behavior which an observer could 
record. This internal aspect of rules may be simply illustrated from the rules of any 
game. Chess players do not merely have habits of moving the Queen in the same way 
which an external observer, who knew nothing about their attitude to the moves 
which they make, could record. In addition, they have a reflective critical attitude to 
this pattern of behavior: they regard it as a standard for all who play the game. Each 
not only moves the Queen in a certain way himself but 'has views' about the propriety 
of all moving the Queen in that way'. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 56-57. 
16 For an extended argument for this claim, see Jakob v. H. Holtermann, 'A Straw Man 
Revisited: Resettling the Score between H.L.A. Hart and Scandinavian Legal 
Realism' (2017) 57(1) Santa Clara Law Review 1. 
17 Notably Kelsen (n 7, 2009) but cf. e.g. also Augsberg (n 12). 
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own approach and traditional doctrinal scholarship. The relationship is 
asymmetric because for the empirical legal scholar to even begin studying her 
preferred external aspect of legal rules, i.e. the is beyond the ought, she shall 
necessarily have to presuppose the validity of the discipline which studies this 
ought in the first place, i.e. doctrinal law. The latter constitutes the conditions 
of possibility of the former. 
Whether applied individually or in concert, these two arguments lead 
proponents of toleration to maintain that the very notion of an empirical turn 
is misguided. Properly understood, for these proponents, the current boom 
in empirical approaches is simply a regrettable development taking time and 
resources away from the primary issues, which continue to require doctrinal 
approaches. 
2. Replacement 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, replacement represents the most radical 
challenge to traditional doctrinal approaches to law. Proponents of 
replacement take the idea of an empirical turn seriously, in the philosophical 
sense in which it is used in relation to Kant's Copernican revolution or the 
linguistic turn. This means seeing the turn to empirical approaches as a 
radical and irreversible scholarly reorientation based on the perception that 
a previously predominant approach to a given field has become obsolete. 
In the context of empirical legal scholarship, then, the 'turn' refers to the 
replacement of doctrinal scholarship by empirical approaches (broadly 
understood). This approach is captured by Quine's description of a parallel 
empirical turn in general philosophy: 'But why all this reconstruction, all this 
make-believe? Why not just see how this construction really proceeds?'18 
Hence, Quine urges philosophers to get 'out of the armchair and into the 
field',19 i.e. to adopt whatever empirical approaches are relevant to 
understand knowledge and science. 
In philosophy proper, this maxim has led to an exodus from philosophy into 
an array of empirical disciplines, from neuroscience to social science studies, 
disciplines which all promise to inform us 'how this construction really 
proceeds'. Turning to the current development in legal scholarship, the 
                                                 
18 Willard Van Orman Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Willard Van Orman 
Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press 1969) 75. 
19 Although this particular slogan is due to Quine's former student Daniel C. Dennett, 
'Out of the Armchair and into the Field' (1988) 9(1) Poetics Today 205. 




parallels are clear. Among a number of proponents of empirical approaches, 
we find an ambition not only to do 'additional useful work', but to replace 
doctrinal approaches to law outright. 
This ambition is generally expressed in a two-stage framework analogous to 
Quine's program: first, the replacement approach to law consists of a negative 
claim that traditional philosophical attempts to justify doctrinal scholarship 
on law have failed and, second, it contains a positive or constructive claim that 
the existence of law should therefore be studied and explained empirically. 
A wide variety of studies in law seem to all fit this general description, 
including political science, Law and Economics, Empirical Legal Studies, 
European New Legal Realism, sociology of law, etc. But these schools also 
differ in a number of ways. Firstly, they differ in their perceptions of what 
kind of empirical study doctrinal scholarship should be replaced by. That is, 
borrowing a phrase from Wittgenstein, proponents of replacement differ in 
their perception of who should be the rightful 'heir to the subject that used 
to be called' doctrinal law.20 These scholars also differ regarding which aspect 
of law they try to explain empirically. Is it law as such? Doctrinal scholarship 
on law? The professional identities of key agents? The institutions, e.g. 
international courts? And replacement theorists differ, finally, with regard to 
how reductionist their approach is, i.e. whether they recognize legal doctrine 
as an independently existing empirical phenomenon in its own right or 
whether, for instance, they focus exclusively on the external aspect of legal 
rules reducing doctrine to, for example, overarching societal structures. 
As yet another example of the replacement approach, the hallmark of the 
European New Legal Realism developed by Madsen and myself is precisely 
that it attempts to approach law in a non-reductionist way, i.e. to define valid 
law in such a way that it can be recognized and studied as a genuinely 
empirical object of study without resorting to traditional doctrinal studies 
based on the legal method. This is an attempt to take law itself seriously as an 
empirical phenomenon and not to succumb in one's empiricism to facile 
reductionism. 
3. Synthesis 
The third position is referred to as synthesis, which denotes approaches which 
emphasize and seek to establish more peaceful co-existence where doctrinal 
law and empirical studies of law are seen as complementary. This position is 
                                                 
20 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Harper 1965) 28. 
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characterised by the notion that doctrinal studies can be enlightened by 
empirical studies and vice versa. Its methodological trademark is a form of 
transdisciplinarity, which is, however, rarely fully exposed and discussed. In 
short, this more 'moderate' programme assumes that both doctrinal and 
empirical work are to benefit from the current boom in empirical 
approaches. However, proponents of synthesis are often silent regarding the 
precise epistemological premises for this collaboration. 
As a position, synthesis is difficult to outline systematically. In some versions, 
it has an element of eclecticism to it and can perhaps best be described 
through examples. One such example is provided by the opening of Brian 
Simpson's chef d'oeuvre on the European Convention, where he bluntly states 
his premise as follows:  
This book is indeed written in the spirit which inspires the journalist who 
features as the letter 'J' in Edward Gorey's illustrated alphabet. He, after 
contemplating the scene of some disagreeable yet attractively newsworthy 
disaster, consoles himself with a gin and water, and thus refreshed, wonders 
how it came about. So it is, for me, with the European Convention. I do, 
however, have a message, albeit a fairly obvious one, which is that political, 
legal, and institutional development is the product of extremely complicated 
interrelationships between individuals, institutions, and governments, with 
their varied ideological commitments and perceptions of reality, history and 
self-interest.21 
From this point onwards, the book takes off without ever explaining how all 
this possibly relates to any given epistemological framework. Instead, these 
important epistemological considerations are tellingly relegated to the 
book's preface. 
Another example is Gregory Shaffer who calls himself an American New 
Legal Realist. Shaffer curiously acts as a social scientist but never gives up 
entirely on doctrinal law.22 He is thus strikingly close to the positions of US 
legal philosophers such as Leiter23 and Schauer24 who also argue that realism 
                                                 
21 A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention (Oxford University Press 2001) viii-ix. 
22 Cf. Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law (2015) 28 
Leiden Journal of International Law 189. For critical discussion, see Holtermann & 
Madsen (n 6, 2015). 
23 Cf. e.g. Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and 
Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2007). 
24 Cf. e.g. Frederic Schauer, 'Editor's Introduction', in Karl N. Llewellyn & Frederic 
Schauer (eds) The Theory of Rules (University of Chicago Press 2011) 1–28. . 




and the associated empirical methods are relevant only on the rare occasions 
when law is underdetermined. This could be viewed as a variation of 
toleration, if not for the highly social scientific dimensions of Shaffer's 
studies. To conclude, under the heading of synthesis we often find some very 
competent studies of law, but when scrutinized on epistemological grounds 
they appear somewhat lacking.25 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As suggested by the descriptions of these three main groupings of attitudes 
toward empirical scholarship on law, as well as the differences within each of 
the positions, the taxonomy presents a broad framework. The three 
categories represent ideal types and in research practice it may sometimes be 
difficult to place specific approaches unambiguously in one of the three 
categories. For instance, it seems, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that some 
of the approaches presented in this issue could be placed in the toleration 
category, despite their application of quite sophisticated quantitative 
machinery to the study of law. 26 In these cases, it seems that the enthusiasm 
for computer-assisted large n-data is tempered by a willingness to 
domesticate or instrumentalize empirical methods and to apply them strictly 
as a science auxiliare for more traditional doctrinal purposes. 
Even if some of these approaches present challenging cases at the borderlines 
between the three categories, the taxonomy is presented with the ambition 
to exhaust the logical space of possible attitudes toward empirical 
approaches to law and to force legal scholars to openly take a stand. The 
framework is intended to provide the conceptual space for rethinking the 
actual interface between doctrinal law and empirical approaches on 
epistemological grounds. Admittedly, this has an element of wishful thinking 
as the actual practices in this regard stand in sharp contrast to the debate in 
the legal field on the place of empirical studies in law. While doctrinal lawyers 
have often been highly defensive, empirical legal scholars very often avoid 
direct debate with proponents of doctrinal scholarship.  
Some may, of course, do this out of genuine agnosticism. They may simply do 
empirical work within each of their own specialized discipline and have no 
strong opinion about its relationship to doctrinal scholarship. Others, 
however, may secretly reject doctrinal approaches and do so because they 
                                                 
25 For extended argument, cf. Holtermann & Madsen (n 2). 
26 Cf. e.g. Frese and Palmer Olsen this issue. 
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consider them both epistemologically problematic and inadequate for 
explaining many current issues of law. Regardless of the position ultimately 
assumed, however, proponents of empirical approaches to law often tend not 
to openly state and defend but rather tacitly presuppose the view they hold. 
This makes epistemological debate highly difficult and leads to the mutually 
dismissive attitude between doctrinal and empirical scholars referred to 
earlier in this piece. This is clearly unproductive and renders legal scholarship 
incapable of really benefiting from some of the methodological and empirical 
revolutions currently taking place. It therefore seems preferable, especially 
for a network of European legal empirical scholars, to instead engage head-
on with the pressing philosophical questions presented at the empirical turn, 
as set out above: 
(1) In what sense do these new empirical studies form part of a legal science? 
(2) Why, if at all, should they be pursued at a law faculty?  
(3) What do the countless new empirical studies tell us about valid law?   
(4) What do they tell us about what legal rules exist, what obligations and 
rights people have, etc.?  
(5) How do empirical findings relate to the kind of knowledge traditionally 
sought in the doctrinal study of law? 
Hopefully, the framework presented here has the potential to help promote 
engagement with these questions. Only in this way can we hope that findings 
such as the ones presented in this special issue will not be summarily 
dismissed with sceptical versions of Armstrong's question: but did they 
discover law? 
